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Differential privacy is a de facto standard in data privacy, with applications
in the public and private sectors. A way to explain differential privacy, which
is particularly appealing to statistician and social scientists, is by means of its
statistical hypothesis testing interpretation. Informally, one cannot effectively test
whether a specific individual has contributed her data by observing the output of a
private mechanism—any test cannot have both high significance and high power.
In this paper, we identify some conditions under which a privacy definition
given in terms of a statistical divergence satisfies a similar interpretation. These
conditions are useful to analyze the distinguishability power of divergences and
we use them to study the hypothesis testing interpretation of some relaxations of
differential privacy based on Rényi divergence. This analysis also results in an
improved conversion rule between these definitions and differential privacy.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [Dwork et al., 2006] is a formal notion of data privacy that en-
ables accurate statistical analyses on populations while preserving privacy for indi-
viduals contributing their data. Differential privacy is supported by a rich theory,
with sophisticated algorithms for common data analysis tasks and composition the-
orems to simplify the design and formal analysis of new private algorithms. This
theory has helped make differential privacy a de facto standard for privacy-preserving
data analysis. Over the last years, differential privacy has found use in the private
sector [Kenthapadi et al., 2019] by companies such as Google [Erlingsson et al., 2014,
Papernot et al., 2018], Apple [team at Apple, 2017], and Uber [Johnson et al., 2018],
and in the public sector by agencies such as the U.S. Census Bureau [Abowd, 2018,
Garfinkel et al., 2018].
A common challenge faced across all uses of differential privacy is to explain its
guarantees to users and policy makers. Indeed, differential privacy first emerged in the
theoretical computer science community, and was only subsequently considered in other
research areas interested in data privacy. For this reason, several works have attempted
to provide different interpretations of the semantics of differential privacy in an effort to























One approach that has been particularly successful, especially when introducing
differential privacy to people versed in statistical data analysis, is the hypothesis testing
interpretation of differential privacy [Wasserman and Zhou, 2010, Kairouz et al., 2015].
One can imagine an experiment where one wants to test, based on the output of a
differentially private mechanism, the null hypothesis that an individual I has contributed
her data to a particular dataset x0. One can also imagine that an alternative hypothesis
is that the individual I has not contributed her data. Then, the definition of differential
privacy guarantees—and is in fact equivalent to requiring—that every hypothesis test
has either low significance (it has a high rate of Type I errors), or low power (it has
a high rate of Type II errors). Under this interpretation, the privacy parameters (ε, δ)
control the tradeoff between significance and power.
Recently, several variants of differential privacy have been proposed [Dwork and Rothblum, 2016,
Bun and Steinke, 2016, Mironov, 2017, Bun et al., 2018, Dong et al., 2019]. Most of
these new privacy definitions have been proposed as privacy notions with better com-
position properties than differential privacy. Having better composition can become a
key advantage when a high number of data accesses is needed for a single analysis (e.g.,
in private deep learning [Abadi et al., 2016]). Technically, many of these variants are
formulated as bounds on the Rényi divergence between the distribution obtained when
running a private mechanism over a dataset where an individual I has contributed her
data versus the case when the private mechanism is run over the dataset where I’s data
is removed.
In this work we develop some analytical tools to study the hypothesis testing
interpretation of privacy definitions based on statistical divergences. The first notion we
introduce is the concept of k-cut of a divergence. Intuitively this notion corresponds to
restricting the distributions that are input to a divergence to a finite domain of cardinality
k. We can think about the functions implementing the restrictions as (probabilistic)
decision rules with k possible outcomes. The second notion we introduce is the concept
of k-generatedness for a divergence. Intuitively, a divergence is k-generated if it is equal
to its k-cut. This notion expresses the number of decisions that are needed in decision
rules to fully characterize the divergence.
We use these two analytical tools to show that a privacy definition based on a
divergence has an hypothesis testing interpretation if and only if it is 2-generated.
We show that the divergence characterizing differential privacy is indeed 2-generated
and that the notion of 2-generatedness corresponds to the notion of privacy regions
introduced in [Kairouz et al., 2015]. On the negative side we show formally that variants
of differential privacy based on the Rényi divergence do not admit directly a hypothesis
testing interpretation because the Rényi divergence is exactly∞-generated (where by∞
we mean that it is infinitely, but countably generated). Nevertheless, we show that one
can achieve the hypothesis testing interpretation by considering the 2-cut of the Rényi
divergence. Intuitively, this says that to characterize relaxations of differential privacy
based on the Rényi divergence through an experiment similar to the one used in the
hypothesis testing interpretation, one needs either to restrict the distinguishability power
of the divergence or to consider an infinite number of possible hypothesis. This shows
a semantics separation between standard differential privacy and relaxations based on
Rényi divergence.
In addition, we use the analytical tools we develop to study the relations between
different privacy definitions. Specifically, we use the 2-cut of Rényi divergence to give
better conversion rules from Rényi differential privacy to (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and
to study the relations with Gaussian Differential Privacy [Dong et al., 2019] another
formal definition of privacy inspired by the hypothesis testing interpretation which was
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recently proposed.
Finally, we study a sufficient condition to guarantee that a divergence is k-generated:
divergences defined as a supremum of a quasi-convex function F over probabilities of
k-partitions are k-generated. This allows one to construct divergences supporting the
hypothesis testing interpretation by requiring them to be defined through an function
F giving a 2-generated divergence. The condition is also necessary for quasi-convex
divergences, characterizing k-generation for all quasi-convex divergences.
Summarizing, our contributions are:
(1) We first introduce the notions of k-cut and k-generatedness for divergences. These
notions allow one to measure the power of divergences in terms of the number of
possible decisions that are needed in a test to fully characterize the divergence.
(2) We show that the divergence used to characterize differential privacy is 2-generated,
supporting the usual hypothesis testing interpretation of differential privacy
(3) We show that Rényi divergence is∞-generated, ruling out a direct hypothesis testing
interpretation for privacy notions based on it. Nevertheless, we show that one
can achieve the hypothesis testing interpretation by considering the 2-cut of Rényi
divergence.
(4) We use our analytic tools to study other notions of privacy and to give better conver-
sion rules between Rényi differential privacy and (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
(5) We give sufficient and necessary conditions for a quasi-convex divergence to be
k-generated.
2 Background: hypothesis testing, privacy, and Rényi
divergences
2.1 Hypothesis testing interpretation for (ε, δ)-differential privacy
We view randomized algorithms as functionsM : X → Prob(Y) from a set X of inputs to
the set Prob(Y) of discrete probability distributions over a set Y of outputs. We assume
that X is equipped with a symmetric adjacency relation—informally, inputs are datasets
and two inputs x0 and x1 are adjacent iff they differ in the data of a single individual.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy (DP) [Dwork et al., 2006]). Let ε > 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
A randomized algorithmM : X → Prob(Y) is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every
pairs of adjacent inputs x0 and x1, and every subset S ⊆ Y, we have:
Pr[M(x0) ∈ S ] ≤ eεPr[M(x1) ∈ S ] + δ.
[Wasserman and Zhou, 2010, Kairouz et al., 2015] proposed a useful interpretation
of this guarantee in terms of hypothesis testing. Suppose that x0 and x1 are adjacent
inputs. The observer sees the output y of running a private mechanismM on one of
these inputs—but does not see the particular input—and wants to guess whether the
input was x0 or x1.
In the terminology of hypothesis testing, let y ∈ Y be an output of a randomized
mechanismM, and take the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H0 : y came fromM(x0), H1 : y came fromM(x1).
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One simple way of deciding between the two hypotheses is to fix a rejection region
S ⊆ Y; if the observation y is in S then the null hypothesis is rejected, and if the
observation y is not in S then the null hypothesis is not rejected. This is an example of a
deterministic decision rule.
Each decision rule can err in two possible ways. A false alarm (i.e. Type I er-
ror) is when the null hypothesis is true but rejected. This error rate is defined as
PFA(x0, x1,M, S )
def
= Pr[M(x0) ∈ S ]. On the other hand, the decision rule may in-
correctly fail to reject the null hypothesis, a false negative (i.e. Type II error). The
probability of missed detection is defined as PMD(x0, x1,M, S )
def
= Pr[M(x1) < S ]. There
is a natural tradeoff between these two errors—a rule with a larger rejection region will
be less likely to incorrectly fail to reject but more likely to incorrectly reject, while a
rule with a smaller rejection region will be less likely to incorrectly reject but more
likely to incorrectly fail to reject.
Differential privacy can now be reformulated in terms of these error rates.
Theorem 2 ([Wasserman and Zhou, 2010, Kairouz et al., 2015]). A randomized algo-
rithmM : X → Prob(Y) is (ε, δ)-differentially private if and only if for every pair of
adjacent inputs x0 and x1, and any rejection region S ⊆ Y, we have: PFA(x0, x1,M, S ) +
eεPMD(x0, x1,M, S ) ≥ 1 − δ and eεPFA(x0, x1,M, S ) + PMD(x0, x1,M, S ) ≥ 1 − δ.
Intuitively, the lower bound on the sum of the two error rates means that no decision
rule is capable of achieving low Type I error and low Type II error simultaneously. Thus,
the output distributions from any two adjacent inputs are statistically hard to distinguish.
Following [Kairouz et al., 2015], we can also reformulate the definition of differen-
tial privacy in terms of a privacy region describing the attainable pairs of Type I and
Type II errors.
Theorem 3 ([Kairouz et al., 2015]). A randomized algorithm M : X → Prob(Y) is
(ε, δ)-differentially private if and only if for every pair of adjacent inputs x0 and x1, and
every rejection region S ⊆ Y, we have
(PFA(x0, x1,M, S ), PMD(x0, x1,M, S )) ∈ R(ε, δ),
where the privacy region R(ε, δ) is defined as:
R(ε, δ) = { (x, y) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1] | (1 − x) ≤ eεy + δ } .
Figure 1 shows an example of a privacy region (the area between the dashed lines)
R(0.67, 0.05) and its mirror image and of all the points (PFA, PMD) that can be generated
by a randomized response mechanismMRR : {0, 1}3 → Prob({0, 1}3) working on vectors
of three bits and flipping each bit with probability 0.34.
Since the original introduction of differential privacy, researchers have proposed
several other variants based on Rényi divergence. The central question of this paper is:
can we give similar hypothesis testing interpretations to these (and other) variants of
differential privacy?
2.2 Variants of differential privacy based on Rényi divergence
We recall here notions of differential privacy based on Rényi divergence.
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Figure 1: Pairs (PFA, PMD) ofMRR and R(0.67, 0.05)
Definition 4 (Rényi divergence [Renyi, 1961]). Let α > 1. The Rényi divergence of















The above definition does not consider the cases α = 1 and α = +∞. However we











The first limit is the well-known KL divergence, while the second limit is the max
divergence that bounds the pointwise ratio of probabilities; standard (ε, 0)-differential
privacy bounds this divergence on distributions from adjacent inputs.
There are several notions of differential privacy based on Rényi divergence, differing
in whether the bound holds for all orders α or just some orders. The first notion we
consider is Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP) [Mironov, 2017].
Definition 5 (Rényi Differential Privacy (RDP) [Mironov, 2017]). Let α ∈ [1,∞). A
randomized algorithm M : X → Prob(Y) is (α, ρ)-Rényi differentially private if for
every pair x0 and x1 of adjacent inputs, we have
DαX(M(x0)||M(x1)) ≤ ρ.
Renyi Differential privacy considers a fixed value of α. In contrast, zero-Concentrated
Differential Privacy (zCDP) [Bun and Steinke, 2016], a simplification of Concentrated
Differential Privacy (CDP) [Dwork and Rothblum, 2016], quantifies over all possible
α > 1.
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Definition 6 (zero-Concentrated Differential Privacy (zCDP) [Bun and Steinke, 2016]).
A randomized algorithmM : X → Prob(Y) is (ξ, ρ)-zero concentrated differentially
private if for every pairs of adjacent inputs x0 and x1, we have
∀α > 1. DαY (M(x0)||M(x1)) ≤ ξ + αρ. (2)
Truncated Concentrated Differential Privacy (tCDP) [Bun et al., 2018] quantifies
over all α below a given threshold.
Definition 7 (Truncated Concentrated Differential Privacy (tCDP) [Bun et al., 2018]). A
randomized algorithmM : X → Prob(Y) is (ρ, ω)-truncated concentrated differentially
private if for every pairs of adjacent inputs x0 and x1, we have
∀1 < α < ω. DαY (M(x0)||M(x1)) ≤ αρ. (3)
These notions are all motivated by bounds on the privacy loss of a randomized





where x0 and x1 are two adjacent inputs. Intuitively, the privacy loss measures how
much information is revealed by an output y. While output values with a large privacy
loss are highly revealing—they are far more likely to result from a private input x0 rather
than a different private input x1—if these outputs are only seen with small probability
then it may be reasonable to discount their influence. Each of the privacy definitions
above bounds different moments of this privacy loss, treated as a random variable when
y is drawn from the output of the algorithm on input x0. The following table summarizes
these bounds.
Privacy Bound on privacy loss L = Lx0→x1
(ε, δ)-DP Pry∼M(x0)[L(y) ≤ e
ε] ≥ 1 − δ
(α, ρ)-RDP Ey∼M(x1)[L(y)
α] ≤ e(α−1)ρ
(ξ, ρ)-zCDP ∀α ∈ (1,∞). Ey∼M(x1)[L(y)
α] ≤ e(α−1)(ξ+αρ)
(ω, ρ)-tCDP ∀α ∈ (1, ω). Ey∼M(x1)[L(y)
α] ≤ e(α−1)αρ
In particular, DP bounds the maximum value of the privacy loss,1 (α, ·)-RDP bounds
the α-moment, zCDP bounds all moments, and (·, ω)-tCDP bounds the moments up
to some cutoff ω. Many conversions are known between these definitions; for in-
stance, RDP, zCDP, and tCDP are known to sit between (ε, 0) and (ε, δ)-differential
privacy in terms of expressivity, up to some modification in the parameters. While this
means that RDP, zCDP, and tCDP can sometimes be analyzed by reduction to standard
differential privacy, converting between the different notions requires weakening the
parameters and often the privacy analysis is simpler or more precise when working
with RDP, zCDP, or tCDP directly. The interested reader can refer to the original
papers [Bun and Steinke, 2016, Mironov, 2017, Bun et al., 2018].
3 k-generated divergences
3.1 Background and notation
We use standard notation and terminology from discrete probability. For every x ∈ X,
we denote by dx the Dirac distribution centered at x defined by dx(x′) = 1 if x = x′ and
1Technically speaking, this is true only for sufficiently well-behaved distributions [Meiser, 2018].
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dx(x′) = 0 otherwise. For any probability distribution µ ∈ Prob(X) and γ : X → Prob(Y),
we define γ(µ) ∈ Prob(Y) to be (γ(µ))(y) =
∑
x∈X(γ(x))(y) · µ(x) for every y ∈ Y . For
any function γ : X → Y , as an abuse of notation, we define γ(µ) ∈ Prob(Y) to be
{x 7→ dγ(x)}(µ), equivalently, (γ(µ))(y) =
∑
x∈γ−1(y) µ(x) for every y ∈ Y . Every function
γ : X → Y can be regarded as {x 7→ dγ(x)} : X → Prob(Y).
3.2 Divergences between distributions
We start from a very general definition of divergences. Our notation includes the domain
of definition of the divergence; this distinction will be important when introducing the
concept of k-generatedness.
Definition 8. A divergence is a family ∆ = {∆X}X of functions
∆X : Prob(X) × Prob(X)→ [0,∞].
We use the notation ∆X(µ1||µ2) to denote the divergence between distributions µ1 and µ2
over X.
Our notion of divergence subsumes the general notion of f -divergence from the
literature [Csiszár, 1963, Csiszàr and Shields, 2004]. In particular, this includes the





(Pr[µ1 ∈ S ] − eεPr[µ2 ∈ S ]).
Specifically, a randomized algorithmM : X → Prob(Y) is (ε, δ)-differentially private if
and only if for every pair of adjacent inputs x0 and x1, we have
∆εY (M(x0)||M(x1)) ≤ δ.
Many useful properties of divergences have been explored in the literature. Our technical
development will involve the following two properties.
• A divergence ∆ satisfies the data-processing inequality iff for every γ : X →
Prob(Y), ∆Y (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) ≤ ∆X(µ1||µ2).
• A divergence ∆ is quasi-convex iff for every α1, . . . , αm ∈ [0, 1] such that∑N







These properties are satisfied by many common divergences. Besides Rényi divergences,
they also hold for all f -divergences [Csiszár, 1963, Csiszàr and Shields, 2004]. We will
consider only divergences satisfying them in the following.
3.3 k-cuts of divergences
We now introduce a technical construction that will be useful in the rest of the paper.














For divergences ∆ that satisfy the data-processing inequality, then the k-cut is
well-defined: it does not depend on the choice of Y .
Lemma 10. If a divergence ∆ satisfies the data-processing inequality, we have the
inequality ∆
k
≤ ∆ and the equality ∆
k
Y = ∆Y for any set Y with |Y | = k.
So, without loss of generality in the sequel we will refer to this as “the” k-cut.
Another interesting property of k-cuts is that a k-cut ∆
k
of a divergence ∆ satisfies
the data-processing inequality, even if the original divergence ∆ does not satisfy it.
Without loss of generality, we can assume the function γ in the definition of a k-cut
to be deterministic. This can be proved by a weak version of Birkhoff-von Neumann
theorem, which decomposes every probabilistic decision rule into a convex combination
of deterministic ones.
Theorem 11 (Weak Birkhoff-von Neumann). Let k, l ∈ N and k > l. Let X and
Y such that |X| = k and |Y | = l. Then for any γ : X → Prob(Y), there exist N ∈
N, γ1, . . . , γN : X → Y and a1, . . . , aN ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑N
m=1 am = 1 and γ(x) =∑N
m=1 amdγm(x) (x ∈ X).
This fact, allow us to consider simplified formulations of a k-cut of a divergence.
Examples of this fact that will be useful in the sequel are the 2-cut and 3-cut of the









Pr[µ1 ∈ S ]αPr[µ2 ∈ S ]1−α












Pr[µ1 ∈ S 1]αPr[µ2 ∈ S 1]1−α
+Pr[µ1 ∈ S 2]αPr[µ2 ∈ S 2]1−α
+Pr[µ1 < S 1 ∪ S 2]αPr[µ2 < S 1 ∪ S 2]1−α
 .
3.4 k-generatedness of divergences
We now introduce the notion of k-generatedness. Informally, k-generatedness is a
measure of the number of decisions that are needed in an hypothesis test to characterize
a divergence.
Definition 12. Let k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. A divergence ∆ is k-generated if a k-cut ∆
k
of ∆ is
equal to ∆ itself.
k-generatedness can also be reformulated as follows:




Lemma 14. The following basic properties hold for all k-generated divergences.
• If ∆ is 1-generated, then ∆ is constant, i.e. there exists c ∈ [0,∞] such that for
every X and every µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X), we have ∆X(µ1||µ2) = c.
• If ∆ is k-generated, then it is also k + 1-generated.
• If ∆ has the data-processing inequality, then it is at least∞-generated.
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• Every k-cut of a divergence ∆ is k-generated.
To compare a k-generated divergence and a divergence, we have the following
lemma where all the inequalities are defined pointwise.




∆′ ≤ ∆ =⇒ ∆′ ≤ ∆
k
.
Also, if ∆ has the data-processing inequality, the k-cut is the greatest k-generated
divergence below ∆:
∆′ ≤ ∆ ⇐⇒ ∆′ ≤ ∆
k
≤ ∆.
3.4.1 A 2-generated divergence for DP
The divergence ∆ε that can be used to characterize (ε, δ)-DP is 2-generated. This implies
that DP can be characterized completely by its hypothesis testing interpretation.
Theorem 16. The ε-divergence ∆ε is 2-generated.






(Pr[µ1 ∈ S ] − eεPr[µ2 ∈ S ])
It is easy to show that this is exactly the same as the original definition of ∆ε, from
which follows that it is 2-generated.
3.4.2 Rényi is∞-generated
In contrast to the divergence ∆ε, the 2-cut of the Rényi divergence is not complete with
respect to the Rényi divergence.
To see this let X = {a, b, c} and let µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X) be defined by µ1(a) = µ1(b) =
µ1(c) = 13 and µ2(a) =
p2
p2+p+1 , µ2(b) =
p
p2+p+1 and µ2(b) =
1
p2+p+1 .







2β + 2−β + 1
max(2α+1, 2β + 1)
≤ DαX(µ1||µ2)
The difference is quantitatively small, but it is nevertheless strictly positive. This shows
also that the Rényi divergence is not 2-generated.
Similary, one can show that the 3-cut is not complete, that the 4-cut is not complete,
etc. In fact, Rényi divergence is exactly∞-generated. Indeed, Rényi divergence satisfies
the data-processing inequality, hence it is at most ∞-generated. Moreover, any f -
divergences whose weight function f is strictly convex is not k-generated for any finite
k. The formulation of Rényi divergence of order α given by exp((α − 1)DαX(µ1||µ2)) is
an f -divergence related to the weight function t 7→ tα, which is strictly convex. Since
the logarithm function is continuous on (0,∞) and strictly monotone, we conclude that
the Rényi divergence is∞-generated. The formal details can be found in the appendix.
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4 Hypothesis Testing Interpretation of Divergences
In this section, we give an hypothesis testing characterization similar to the one that
differential privacy satisfies for the 2-cut of an arbitrary divergence.
We first define privacy regions for divergences using their 2-cuts.





∣∣∣∣ ∆2{Acc,Rej}((1 − x)dAcc + xdRej||ydAcc + (1 − y)dRej) ≤ ρ } .
Notice that if ∆ satisfies the data-processing inequality, or is 2-generated, then
∆
2
{Acc,Rej} in the definition above can be replaced by ∆{Acc,Rej}.
As an example, we can give the privacy region of DP.
R∆
ε
(δ) = { (x, y) | 1 − x ≤ eεy + δ, x ≤ eε(1 − y) + δ }
Privacy regions are intimately related to the hypothesis testing interpretation of
privacy definitions based on divergences.
Theorem 18. Let µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X). ∆
2
X(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ holds if and only if for any γ : X →
Prob({Acc, Rej}),
(Pr[γ(µ1) = Rej],Pr[γ(µ2) = Acc]) ∈ R∆(ρ).
In the theorem above, the functions γ : X → Prob({Acc, Rej}) can be seen as
probabilistic decision rules. Moreover, the privacy region can be actually relaxed to
R∆(ρ) ∪ { (x, y) | x + y ≥ 1 } since for any decision rule γ : X → Prob({Acc, Rej}), we
can take its negation ¬γ. Hence we do not need to check the cases of Pr[γ(µ1) =
Rej] + Pr[γ(µ2) = Acc] > 1. This also corresponds to the symmetry that we have in
their graphical representations.
Finally, if a divergence ∆ is quasi-convex, we also have the equivalent of Theorem
18 under deterministic decision rules. In this case, we have the following reformulation.
Let µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X). ∆
2
X(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ iff for any S ⊆ X,
(Pr[µ1 ∈ S ],Pr[µ2 < S ]) ∈ R∆(ρ).
This give us the hypothesis testing characterization of DP, since the ε-divergence is
2-generated and quasi-convex.
Corollary 19. Let µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X). Set ε, δ ≥ 0. ∆εX(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ iff for any S ⊆ X,
(Pr[µ1 ∈ S ],Pr[µ2 < S ]) ∈ R∆
ε
(δ).
We conclude this section by stressing that Theorem 18 tell us two important things:
• Every privacy definition similar to differential privacy but based on a 2-generated
divergence is characterized completely by its hypothesis testing interpretation.
• For every privacy definition similar to differential privacy but based on an arbitrary
divergence we can have an hypothesis testing interpretations by considering its
2-cut. However, this characterization will not be necessarily complete.
The second remark applies in particular to relaxations of differential privacy based on
the Rényi divergence: if we want to have the hypothesis testing interpretation for one of
these relaxations we can use the 2-cut of the Rényi divergence.
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5 Applications
In this section we will use the technical tools we developed in the previous sections to
better study the relations between different privacy definitions.
5.1 Conversions from Divergences to DP
Privacy regions can be used to give better conversion rules between privacy definitions
based on divergences and differential privacy. Let ∆′ = {∆′X}X : set be a divergence
satisfying the data-processing inequality. We want to find the minimal parameters
(ε(ρ), δ(ρ)) such that ∆′X(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ implies ∆
ε(ρ)
X (µ1||µ2) ≤ δ(ρ).




(δ(ρ)) holds if and only if for any
pair µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X),
∆′X(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ =⇒ ∆
ε(ρ)
X (µ1||µ2) ≤ δ(ρ).
This means that to find a good conversion law we can just compare the privacy regions.
5.1.1 Better Conversion from RDP to DP
Figure 2: A refined conversion law from RDP to DP. The gray region is RD
α
(ρ). The
gray and black lines show original and refiend DP-bounds for the same δ.
Using privacy regions, we can refine Mironov’s conversion law from RDP to DP in
a simple way.
Lemma 20 ([Mironov, 2017, Prop. 3]). If a mechanism M is (α, ρ)-RDP then the
mechanism is also (ρ − log δ/(α − 1), δ)-DP for any 0 < δ < 1.






∣∣∣ xα(1 − y)1−α + (1 − x)αy1−α ≤ eρ(α−1) } .
Here we assume 01−α = 0.
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By an extension of Lemma 15, to find ε satisfying
∀X.∀µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X). DαX(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ =⇒ ∆
ε
X(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ,
it is necessary and sufficient to find ε satisfying
∀X.∀µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X). Dα
2
X(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ =⇒ ∆
ε
X(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ.





Mironov’s proof of conversion law from RDP to DP [Mironov, 2017, Propisition 3]: we
obtain,
xα(1 − y)1−α + (1 − x)αy1−α ≤ eρ(α−1)
=⇒ (1 − x)αy1−α ≤ eρ(α−1)
=⇒ (1 − x) ≤ (eρy)
α−1
α (†)
=⇒ (eρy > δ
α
α−1 =⇒ (1 − x) ≤ eρ−log d/(α−1)y)
∧ (eρy ≤ δ
α
α−1 =⇒ (1 − x) ≤ δ)
=⇒ (1 − x) ≤ eρ−log d/(α−1)y + δ. (‡)
The equality (‡) derives original Mironov’s result [Mironov, 2017, Propisition 3]. Now,
starting from (†), we have a better bound for DP as follows: consider a curve C given
by the equation
1 − x = (eρy)
α−1
α ⇐⇒ x = 1 − (eρy)
α−1
α















(t)(y − t) + (eρ(1 − t))
α−1
α























1 − δ = −t
dx
dy
(t) + 1 − (eρt)
α−1


































) + ρ −














As we mentioned, it is equivalent to
∀X.∀µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X). DαX(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ =⇒ ∆
ε
X(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ.
Therefore, we have the following better conversion law:
Theorem 21. If a mechanismM is (α, ρ)-RDP then it is (ρ + log((α − 1)/α) − (log δ +
logα)/(α − 1), δ)-DP for any 0 < δ < 1.
As a conjecture, if we calculate tangents of the boundary of the privacy region
RD
α
(ρ), we have optimal conversion law from (α, ρ)-RDP to DP. The boundary of
RD
α
(ρ) is given by the equation
xα(1 − y)1−α + (1 − x)αy1−α = eρ(α−1).
5.2 On Gaussian Differential Privacy
Gaussian differential privacy (GDP) [Dong et al., 2019, Def. 2.6] has been recently
proposed as a privacy definition trading-off PMD and PFA. This can be characterized by
means of privacy regions. We have seen that privacy regions correspond to 2-generated
divergence. Thus, a natural question is: can we characterize GDP using a 2-generated





∃γ : X → Prob({Acc, Rej}).
Pr[γ(µ2) = Acc]
≥ Φ(Φ−1(Pr[γ(µ1) = Rej]) − δ)
 .
where Φ is the standard normal CDF. The data-processing inequality of the divergence







∣∣∣∣∣∣ y ≥ Φ(Φ−1(1 − x) − δ)1 − y ≥ Φ(Φ−1(x) − δ)
}
.
By Theorem 18, ∆Gauss is 2-generated.
5.3 Informativeness of k-cuts
The concept of k-cut can be related to the ability that a divergence has of distinguishing
two distributions.
Definition 22. We say that a divergence ∆ is δ-distinguishing a pair µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X)
of probability distributions if ∆X(µ1, µ2) > δ.
Now, consider a divergence ∆ satisfying the data-processing inequality. Then the










≤ · · · .
Thus for any divergence with data-processing inequality, k + 1-cut of ∆ is always
more informative than the k-cut of ∆ for every k ∈ N in the following sense. If the
13




X (µ1||µ2) ≥ ∆
k
X(µ1||µ2) > δ.
For example, for the pair µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob({a, b, c}) in the counterexample given in Section
3.4.2, we can find a value of δ such that Dα
3




6 A characterization of k-generated divergences
As we have seen, k-generated divergences satisfy a number of useful properties; known
divergences from the literature can be classified according to this parameter k - we have
shown some examples here, more examples are in the supplemental material. In the
other direction, we give a simple condition to ensure that a divergence is k-generated:
the suprema of quasi-convex functions over size k-partitions determine k-generated
divergences.
Theorem 23. Let F : [0, 1]2k → [0,∞] be a quasi-convex function. Then the divergence






F (µ1(A1), · · · , µ1(Ak), µ2(A1), · · · , µ2(Ak)) .
Proof. The quasi-convexity is obvious from the quasi-convexity of F : [0, 1]2k → [0,∞].
We show the k-generatedness. We take the k-cut with respect to the k-element set















(γ(µ1))(A1), · · · , (γ(µ1))(Ak),







(γ(µ1))(p−1(1)), · · · , (γ(µ1))(p−1(k)),







(((p • γ)(µ1))(1), · · · , ((p • γ)(µ1))(k),






((γ(µ1))(1), · · · , (γ(µ1))(k),
(γ(µ2))(1), · · · , (γ(µ2))(k)
)
.
Here by weak Birkhoff-von Neumann thorem (countable version), every function
γ : X → Prob({1, 2, . . . , k}) is decomposed into a (countable) convex combination
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∑








((γ(µ1))(1), · · · , (γ(µ1))(k),









i∈I ai(η{1,2,...,k} ◦ γi)(µ1))(1),
· · · , (
∑
i∈I ai(η{1,2,...,k} ◦ γi)(µ1))(k),
(
∑
i∈I ai(η{1,2,...,k} ◦ γi)(µ2))(1),
· · · , (
∑








i∈I ai(γi(µ1))(1), · · · ,
∑
i∈I ai(γi(µ1))(k),∑










((γi(µ1))(1), · · · , (γi(µ1))(k),






((γ(µ1))(1), · · · , (γ(µ1))(k),






(µ1(γ−1(1)), · · · , µ1(γ−1(k)),








(γ(µ1))(A1), · · · , (γ(µ1))(Ak),











∆FX(µ1||µ2). This completes the proof. 
This result characterizes k-generated quasi-convex divergences. It also serves as
a useful tool to construct new divergences with a hypothesis testing interpretation, by
varying the quasi-convex function F.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed analytical tools to study the hypothesis testing in-
terpretation of privacy definitions similar to differential privacy but measured with
another statistical divergence. We introduced the notions of k-cut and k-generatedness
for divergences. These notions quantifies the number of decisions that are needed in
an experiment similar to the ones used in hypothesis testing to fully characterize the
divergence. We used these notions to study the hypothesis testing interpretation of
relaxations of differential privacy based on the Rényi divergence. These notions give
a measure of the complexity that tools for formal verification may have. We leave the
study of this connection for future work.
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A Weak version of Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem
Theorem 24 (Weak Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem (Theorem 11)). Let k, l ∈ N and
k > l. For any γ : k → Prob(l), there are γ1, γ2, . . . , γN : k → l and 0 ≤ a1, a2, . . . , aN ≤
1 such that
∑N
m=1 am = 1 and γ(i) =
∑N
m=1 amdγm(i) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The cardinal k can be relaxed to countable infinite cardinal ω, and then the families
{γ j} j and {a j} j may be countable infinite.
Proof. Consider the following matrix representation f of γ:
f =

f1,1 · · · fl,1
...
...
f1,k · · · fl,k
 .
where fi, j = γ(i)( j) and
∑N
j=1 fi, j = 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
For any h : k → l, the matrix representation g of ({x 7→ dx} ◦ h) is
g =

g1,1 · · · gl,1
...
...
g1,k · · · gl,k

satisfying that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l, there is exactly 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that gi, j = 1 and
gi,s = 0 for s , j. Conversely, any matrix g satisfying this condition corresponds to
some function h : k → l. Consider the family G of matrix representations of maps of the
form ({x 7→ dx} ◦ h). We give an algorithm decomposing f to a convex sum of g:
1. Let r0 = 1 and f̃0 = f . We have
∑
j( f̃0)i, j = r0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
2. For given 0 ≤ rm ≤ 1 and f̃m satisfying
∑
j( f̃m)i, j = rm for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l, we define





( f̃m)s,t, rm+1 = rm − αm+1,
(gm+1)i, j =
1 j = argmaxs ( f̃m)i,s0 (otherwise) , f̃m+1 = f̃m − αm+1 · gm+1.
3. If rs+1 = 0 then we terminate. Otherwise, we repeat the previous step.
In each step, we obtain the following conditions:
• We have gm+1 ∈ G because gm+1 can be written as gm+1 = {x 7→ dx}◦(λi. argmax
s
( f̃m)i,s).
• We have 0 < αm+1 whenever 0 < rm because
αm+1 = 0 ⇐⇒ ∃i. max
j
( f̃m)i, j = 0 =⇒ ∃i. rm =
∑
j
( f̃m)i, j = 0.
• We have 0 ≤ ( f̃m+1)i, j ≤ 1 for any (i, j) from the following equation:
( f̃m+1)i, j =
( f̃m)i, j −mint maxs( f̃m)t,s if j = argmaxs ( f̃m)i,s( f̃m)i, j otherwise .
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When i = argmin
s
maxt( f̃m)s,t and j = argmax
s
( f̃m)i,s, we obtain ( f̃m+1)i, j = 0 while
0 < ( f̃m+1)i, j. This implies that the number of 0 in f̃m increases in this operation.
• We also have
∑
j( f̃m+1)i, j = rm+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k because∑
j
( f̃m+1)i, j =
∑
j
( f̃m)i, j − αm+1 ·
∑
j
(g̃m+1)i, j = rm − αm+1 · 1 = rm+1.
Therefore the construction of gl ∈ G, αl ∈ [0, 1], f̃l and rl ∈ [0, 1] terminates within k · l
steps. When the construction terminates at the step N (rN = 0 also holds), we have a
convex decomposition of f by f =
∑N
m=1 αm · gm where
∑N
m=1 αm = 1. This implies By
taking γ1, γ2, . . . , γN : k → l such that gm is a matrix representation of ({x 7→ dx} ◦ γm),
we obtain γ(i) =
∑N
m=1 amdγm(i) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k with 0 ≤ a1, a2, . . . , aN ≤ 1 and∑N
m=1 am = 1. 
B Omitted Proofs
B.1 Compositions of probabilistic processes
For simplicity, we introduce the composition operator of probabilistic processes (inspired
from [Giry, 1982]). For any γ1 : X → Prob(Z) and γ : Z → Prob(Y), we define their
composition (γ • γ1) : X → Prob(Z) by (γ • γ1)(x)
def
= γ(γ1(x)). It is easy to check that
the composition (γ • γ1) satisfies (γ • γ1)(µ) = γ(γ1(µ)) for every µ ∈ Prob(X).
• The composititon operator • is associative: γ • (γ1 • γ2) = (γ • γ1) • γ2 holds for
all γ2 : W → Prob(X), γ1 : X → Prob(Z), and γ : Z → Prob(Y).
• The function ηX : X → Prob(X) defined by ηX = {x 7→ dX} is the unit of operator
•: we have γ • ηX = γ and ηY • γ = γ for all γ : X → Prob(Y)
Thanks to the unit law and associativity of • as an abuse of notations, we define
• (γ • γ1) : X → Prob(Z) for γ1 : X → Z and γ : Z → Prob(Y) by γ • (ηZ ◦ γ1).
• (γ • γ1) : X → Prob(Z) for γ1 : X → Prob(Z) and γ : Z → Y by (ηY ◦ γ) • γ1.
• (γ • γ1) : X → Prob(Z) for γ1 : X → Z and γ : Z → Y by (ηY ◦ γ) • (ηZ ◦ γ1),
which is equal to ηY ◦ (γ ◦ γ1).
Notice that, γ(µ) ∈ Prob(Y) defined under γ : X → Y and µ ∈ Prob(X) is exactly
(ηY ◦ γ)(µ).
B.2 Proof of the data-processing inequality of k-cuts
Lemma 25. For any divergence ∆, every k-cut ∆
k
satisfies data-processing inequality.


















∆Y ((γ • γ1)(µ1)||(γ • γ1)(µ2))
≤ sup
γ′ : X→Prob(Y)
∆Y (γ′(µ1)||γ′(µ2)) = ∆
k
X(µ1||µ2).
The inequality is obtained by the inclusion
{ (γ • γ1) : X → ProbY | γ : Z → Prob(Y) } ⊆
{




B.3 Proof of Lemma 10
Lemma 26 (Lemma 10). If a divergence ∆ has the data-processing inequality, we have
the inequality ∆
k
≤ ∆ and the equality ∆
k
Y = ∆Y for any set Y with |Y | = k.








Thanks to the data-processing inequality of ∆, we have ∆
k






∆W (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) ≤ ∆X(µ1, µ2).
Now, we consider a set Y with |Y | = k. We already have ∆
k
Y ≤ ∆Y . We want to prove
∆Y ≤ ∆
k
Y Since |Y | = |W | = k, there is a bijection f : Y → W. We then obtain for every
pair ν1, ν2 ∈ Prob(Y),
∆Y (ν1||ν2) = ∆Y ( f−1( f (ν1))|| f−1( f (ν2))) ≤ ∆W ( f (ν1)|| f (ν2)) ≤ ∆
k
Y (ν1||ν2)
The first and second inequalities are obtained by the dataprocessing inequality and the
definition of k-cut respectively. 
B.4 Proof of Lemma 13





Proof. Suppose that ∆ is equal to the k-cut of ∆ with respect to a set W satisfying









always satisfies data-processing inequality, the divergence ∆ itself do so. We
fix an arbitrary set |Y | with |Y | = k. Since |Y | = |W | = k, there is a bijection f : Y → W.






∆W ( f ( f−1(γ(µ1)))|| f ( f−1(γ(µ1))))
≤ sup
γ : X→Prob(W)
∆Y ( f−1(γ(µ1))|| f−1(γ(µ1)))
= sup
γ : X→Prob(W)
∆Y (( f−1 • γ)(µ1)||( f−1 • γ)(µ1))
≤ sup
γ : X→Prob(Y)
∆Y (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) ≤ ∆X(µ1||µ2).
Here, the first and last inequalities are obtained from the data-processing inequality of
∆. The second inequality is proved from the inclusion{
( f−1 • γ) : X → Prob(Y)
∣∣∣ γ : X → Prob(W) } ⊆ { γ : X → Prob(Y) } .

B.5 Proof of Basic Properties of k-generatedness (Lemma 14)
Lemma 28 (Lemma 14 (1)). If ∆ is 1-generated, then ∆ is constant, i.e. there exists
c ∈ [0,∞] such that for every X and every µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X), we have ∆X(µ1||µ2) = c.
Proof. When ∆ is 1-generated, there is a singleton set {a} such that, for every pair




Now, the set Prob({a}) is a singleton set {da}, and therefore both γ(µ1) and γ(µ1) are
equal to da for every γ : X → Prob({a}) and every pair µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X). Hence,
∆X(µ1||µ2) = c where c = ∆{a}(da||da). 
Lemma 29 (Lemma 14 (2)). If ∆ is k-generated, then it is also k + 1-generated.
Proof. Suppose that ∆ is equal to the k-cut of ∆ with respect to a set W satisfying






Let V be an arbitrary set with |V | = k + 1. We define the k + 1-cut of ∆
k
with respect to


































∆W (γ′(µ1)||γ′(µ2)) = ∆
k
X(µ1||µ2)
The equality is obtained by the equality{
(γ1 • γ) : X → Prob(W)




γ′ : X → Prob(W)
}
The inclusion ⊆ is obvious. We show the reverse inclusion ⊇. Since |V | ≥ |W |, there
is a pair of function f : W → V and g : V → W such that g ◦ f = idW . Then, every
γ′ : X → Prob(W) can be decomposed into γ′ = γ1 • γ where γ = ( f • γ) and γ1 = g
(strictly, γ = ((ηV ◦ f ) • γ) and γ1 = ηW ◦ g ). 
Lemma 30 (Lemma 14 (3)). If ∆ has the data-processing inequality, then it is at least
∞-generated.
Proof. We fix a pair µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X). The set Y = supp(µ1) ∪ supp(µ1) is at most
countable. Hence there are two functions f : X → N and g : N→ X such that (g◦ f )(x) =
x for every x ∈ Y . We then have µ1 = (g ◦ f )(µ1) and µ2 = (g ◦ f )(µ2). Thus,
∆X(µ1||µ2) = ∆X((g ◦ f )(µ1)||(g ◦ f )(µ2))





The last part is an∞-cut. The first and last inequality is obtained by the data-processing
inequality. The second one is obvious ( f : X → N is regarded as {x 7→ d f (x)} : X →
Prob(N)). 
Lemma 31 (Lemma 14 (4)). Every k-cut of a divergence ∆ is always k-generated.





in a almost the same way as Lemma 14 (2). 
Continuity of divergence (Lemma 14(3) in general setting) We can extend the
results on divergences in the discrete setting to general measurable setting using the
continuity of divergences. We say that a divergence ∆ is continuous if for any pair







If ∆ is continuous and satisfies data-processing inequality we have ∞-generatedness




























Here fn : {0, 1, 2, . . . , n−1} → N is the inclusion mapping, and gn : N→ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n−
1} is defined by gn(k) = k if (k < n) and gn(k) = n − 1 otherwise. We have (gn ◦ fn) =
id{0,1,2,...,n−1}.
The first and last inequalities are obtained from data-processing inequality. The
second inequality is obvious.
B.6 Proof of Lemma 15
Lemma 32 (Lemma 15). Consider a divergence ∆ and a k-generated divergence ∆′.
For any k-cut ∆
k
of ∆,
∆′ ≤ ∆ =⇒ ∆′ ≤ ∆
k
.
Also, if ∆ has the data-processing inequality, the k-cut is the greatest k-generated
divergence below ∆:
∆′ ≤ ∆ ⇐⇒ ∆′ ≤ ∆
k
≤ ∆.
Proof. Since ∆′ is k-generated, for any choice of Y with |Y | = k, we have





⇐⇒ ∆′ ≤ ∆
k
.
The second statement is proved as follows: From the first statement of this lemma and
Lemma 3 (Lemma 10 in the paper), We have
∆′ ≤ ∆ =⇒ ∆′ ≤ ∆
k
≤ ∆
The converse direction is obvious. 
An extended version. We can extend this theorem to more suitable for conversion
laws of differential privacy.
Lemma 33 (Lemma 15, extended). Consider a divergence ∆ satisfying data-processing
inequality and a k-generated divergence ∆′.
∀X.∀µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X).(∆X(µ1||µ2) ≤ δ =⇒ ∆′X(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ)
⇐⇒ ∀X.∀µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X).(∆
k




Proof. ( ⇐= ) Obvious from Lemma 3 (Lemma 10 in the paper). ( =⇒ ) From the
assumption, we obtain
∀X.∀µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X).∀γ : X → Prob(Y).
∆Y (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) ≤ δ =⇒ ∆′Y (γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) ≤ ρ.
This implies
∀X.∀µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X).(∆
k
X(µ1||µ2 ≤ δ =⇒ ∆′
k
X(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ)
Thanks to the k-generatedness of ∆′, we conclude the statement of this lemma. 
B.7 Proof of 2-generatedness of ε-divergence
Theorem 34. The ε-divergence ∆ε is 2-generated for all ε.
Proof. We recall that the ε-divergence ∆ε is quasi-convex (moreover, jointly convex)
and satisfies data-processing inequality. We choose a set Y = {Acc, Rej}, and take the






We show this is equal to the original ∆εX(µ1||µ2). Without loss of generality we may
assume X is at most countable. If X is an arbitrary set, we can restrict it to countable set
in a similar way as the proof of Lemma 7 (Lemma 14(3) in the paper).
By the weak Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem (Theorem 1 in the appendix), each
γ : X → Prob({Acc, Rej}) can be decomposed into a convex combination γ(x) =∑
i∈I αidγi(x) of functions γi : X → {Acc, Rej} (i ∈ I) where I is a countable set and∑





































(Pr[µ1 ∈ S ] − eεPr[µ2 ∈ S ])
= ∆εX(µ1||µ2)
We have the 2-generatedness: ∆ε
2
= ∆ε. The equality (∗) is proved as follows: for
given γ and A, we take S = γ−1. Conversely, for any S ⊆ X we take A = {Acc} and
γ = χS , which is the indicator function of S defined by χS (x) = 1 if x ∈ S and χS (x) = 0
otherwise. 
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General version We can extend this result to general measurable setting by using the
continuity of ∆ε (see also [Liese and Vajda, 2006]), which is obtained by f -divergence
characterization of ∆ε [Barthe and Olmedo, 2013]. For general measurable sapce X and















Functions are assumed to be measurable.
B.8 Counterexample: Rényi-divergence is not 2-generated



















p2 + p + 1
da +
p
p2 + p + 1
db +
1
p2 + p + 1
dc
Since Rényi divergence is quasi-convex and satisfies data-processing inequality, it
suffices to show the proper inequality Dα
{Acc,Rej}
(γ(µ1)||γ(µ2)) < Dα{a,b,c}(µ1||µ2) holds
for any deterministic decision rule γ : {a, b, c} → {Acc, Rej}. There are 8 cases
of γ : {a, b, c} → {Acc, Rej}, but thanks to the data-processing inequality and re-
flexivity of Rényi divergence, it suffices to consider 3 cases: (γ(a), γ(b), γ(c)) =








p2(1−α) + p1−α + 1
2α(p2 + p)1−α + 1
,
p2(1−α) + p1−α + 1
2α(p2 + 1)1−α + p1−α
,
p2(1−α) + p1−α + 1




2β + 2−β + 1
2α(p + 1)1−α + 2−β
,
2β + 2−β + 1
2α−β(p2 + 1)1−α + 1
,
2β + 2−β + 1




2β + 2−β + 1
2α+1
,










2β + 2−β + 1
2α+1
,





holds for any γ : {a, b, c} → {Acc, Rej}. By the data-processing inequality of Rényi
divergence, this discussion does not depend on the choice of {Acc, Rej}. By weak
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2β + 2−β + 1
2α+1
,




B.9 Proof of∞-generatedness of Rényi-divergence
f -divergences is a class of divergences that are characterized by convex functions. For
a given convex function f : [0,∞)→ R satisfying limt→0+ t f (0/t) = 0 (this function is
































Remark that every f -divergence is quasi-convex (moreover jointly convex) and continu-
ous, and satisfies data-processing inequality (see also [Liese and Vajda, 2006, Theorems
14–16]).
Since the mapping t 7→ 1
α−1 log t is monotone, every α-Rényi divergence D
α is also
quasi-convex and satisfies data-processing inequality. Thanks to the data-processing
inequality, every α-Rényi divergence Dα is at least∞-generated. We need to prove that
for every finite k, every α-Rényi divergence Dα is not k-generated. To prove this, we
use that the mapping t 7→ tα is strictly convex.
Lemma 36. If a weight function is strictly convex, its f -divergence ∆ f is not k-generated
for every finite k.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume k > 1.
Consider a pair µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob({0, 1, 2, . . . , k}) satisfying supp(µ1) = supp(µ2) =
{0, 1, 2, . . . , k} and µ1(i)/µ2(i) , µ1( j)/µ2( j) where 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k + 1 and i , j. We can


































µ2(i) = ∆ f (µ1||µ2).
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Since k + 1 > k, by Dirichlet’s pigeonhole principle, for any γ : {0, 1, 2, . . . , k} →
{0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1}, for some j ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , k}, there are at least two different i1, i2 ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1} such that γ(i1) = j and γ(i2) = j. From the assumption on µ1 and µ2,
we have (µ1(i1)/µ2(i1)) , (µ1(i2)/µ2(i2)) Since the function f is strictly convex, by the







































{0,1,2,...,k}(µ1||µ2). Since every f -divergence satisfies data-processing
inequality, this discussion does not depend on the choice of set Y with |Y | = k in the
construction of the k-cut ∆ f
k
. Thus, ∆ f is not k-generated for any finite k. 
Since the mapping t 7→ 1
α−1 log t is strict, we conclude,
Corollary 37. For any alpha > 1, the α-Rényi divergence Dα is not k-generated for
every finite k.
B.10 Proof of Theorem 18
Theorem 38 (Theorem 18). Let µ1, µ2 ∈ Prob(X). ∆
2
X(µ1||µ2) ≤ ρ holds if and only if
for any γ : X → Prob({Acc, Rej}),
(Pr[γ(µ1) = Rej],Pr[γ(µ2) = Acc]) ∈ R∆(ρ).
Proof. We fix a 2-cut ∆
2
of a divergence ∆. Suppose that it is defined with a set W










∣∣∣∣ ∆2{Acc,Rej}((1 − x)dAcc + xdRej||ydAcc + (1 − y)dRej) ≤ ρ } .
Since every probability distribution ν ∈ Prob({Acc, Rej}) can be rewritten as ν = Pr[ν =




⇐⇒ (Pr[γ(µ1) = Rej],Pr[γ(µ2) = Acc]) ∈ R∆(ρ).








( =⇒ ) Obvious by the data-processing inequality of the 2-cut ∆
2
.
(⇐= ) The assumption is equivalent to
∀γ : X → Prob({Acc, Rej}).∀γ′ : {Acc, Rej} → Prob(W).
(∆W (γ′(γ(µ1))||γ′(γ(µ2))) ≤ ρ)
Since |W | = |{Acc, Rej}| = 2, this is equivalent to
γ′′ : X → Prob(W).∆W (γ′′(µ1)||γ′′(µ2)) ≤ ρ.
For any γ : X → Prob({Acc, Rej}). and γ′ : {Acc, Rej} → Prob(W). we take γ′′ = γ′ • γ.
Conversely for any γ′′ : X → Prob(W) we take γ = f • γ′′ and γ′ = f−1 where
f : {Acc, Rej} → W is a bijection. 
B.11 Proof of Theorem 23 in general setting
If the quasi-convex function F : [0, 1]2k → [0,∞] is also continuous, we can extend
Theorem 23 to general measurable setting.
Theorem 39 (k-generatedness in general setting). Assume that F : [0, 1]2k → [0,∞] is
quasi-convex and continuous. For any measurable space X, we have








F(µ1(A1), · · · , µ1(Ak), µ2(A1), · · · , µ2(Ak))
∣∣∣ {Ai}ki=1 : m’ble partition of X }
= sup
{
F(µ1( f −1(1)), · · · , µ1( f −1(k)), µ2( f −1(1)), · · · , µ1( f −1(k)))
∣∣∣ f : X → {1, 2, . . . , k} }
= sup { F(( f (µ1))(1), · · · , ( f (µ1))(k), ( f (µ2))(1), · · · , ( f (µ2))(k)) | f : X → {1, 2, . . . , k} }
≤ sup { F((γ(µ1))(1), · · · , (γ(µ1))(k), (γ(µ2))(1), · · · , (γ(µ2))(k)) | γ : X → Prob({1, 2, . . . , k}) }
≤ sup
 F
 (γ(µ1))(A1), · · · , (γ(µ1))(Ak),(γ(µ2))(A1), · · · , (γ(µ2))(Ak)





∆{1, 2, . . . , k}(γ(µ1), γ(µ2))
Note that we treat {1, 2, . . . , k} as a finite discrete space. Consider the family {Jn}∞n=1 of
finite sets (discrete spaces) defined as follows:
Jn =
{
( j1, . . . , jk)
∣∣∣ j1, . . . , jk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1},Cnj1... jk , ∅ } .
We fix a measurable function γ : X → Prob(k) and treat Prob(k) as a subset of [0, 1]k.
For each n ∈ N, we define a measurable partition {Cnj1... jk } j1,..., jk∈{0,1,...,2n−1} of X by
Cnj1... jk = γ
−1(Bnj1... jk )
where Bnj1... jN = D j1 × · · · × D jk (( j1 . . . jk) ∈ Jn),
Dn0 = {0} and D
n
l+1 = (l/2
n, (l + 1)/2n
]
(l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 2n − 1).
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We next define m∗n : X → Jn and mn : Jn → X as follows: m
∗
n(x) is the unique element
( j1, . . . , jk) ∈ Jn satisfying x ∈ Cnj1,..., jk , and we choose mn( j1, . . . , jk) is an element of
Cnj1,..., jk . Thanks to the measurability of each C
n
j1... jk
, the function m∗n is measurable, and
the measurability of mn follows from the discreteness of Jn. From the construction of
{Cnj1... jk } j1,..., jk∈{0,1,...,2n−1}, for any n ∈ N, x ∈ X, and i ∈ I, we have,
|γ(x)(i) − (γ ◦ mn ◦ m∗n)(x)(i)| ≤ 1/2
n
This implies that the sequence {γ ◦ mn ◦ m∗n}
∞
n=1 of measurable function converges
uniformly to γ. Hence, for any n ∈ N and D ⊆ k, we have∣∣∣∣∣∫ γ(x)(D) dµ1(x) − ∫ (γ ◦ mn ◦ m∗n)(x)(D) dµ1(x)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1/2n
Hence the sequence of probability measures {(γ ◦ mn ◦ m∗n)(µ1)}
∞
n=1 converges to the
probability measure γ(µ1). Similarly, {(γ ◦ mn ◦ m∗n)(µ2)}
∞
n=1 converges to γ(µ2).
By the continuity of F, we obtain













∆{1,2,...,k}(((γ ◦ mn)(m∗n(µ1))), ((γ ◦ mn)(m
∗
n(µ2))))














f (m∗n(µ1)))(1), · · · , ( f (m
∗
n(µ1)))(k),
( f (m∗n(µ2)))(1), · · · , (( f (m
∗
n(µ1)))(k)
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣ f : Jn → {1, 2, . . . , k}
}
≤ sup{F((g(µ1))(1), · · · , (g(µ1))(k), (g(µ2))(1), · · · , (g(µ2))(k)) | g : X → {1, 2, . . . , k}}
= ∆X(µ1, µ2).
This implies supγ : X→Prob(k) ∆k(γ(µ1), γ(µ2)) ≤ ∆X(µ1, µ2). 
C Additional Results
C.1 Total variation distance is 2-generated
We recall the definition of the total variation distance
TVX(µ1||µ2) = sup
S⊆X
|Pr[µ1 ∈ S ] − Pr[µ2 ∈ S ]|.
In a similar way as ε-divergence ∆ε, we can prove 2-generatedness of the total variation
distance TV, but we can prove it easily by applying Theorems 16–17 (Theorem 23 in the
paper).
Define F : [0, 1]4 → [0,∞] by F(x, x′, y, y′) = |x − y|. It is easy to check that the
function is obviously quasi-convex, and that we have TV = ∆F .
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C.2 An optimal conversion law from Hellinger to DP
We recall the definition of the Hellinger distance





Since it is the f -divergence of weight function w(t) =
√
t − 1 (strict convex), the
Hellinger distance is exactly∞-generated, quasi-convex and continuous.
Here is the essense of an optimal conversion law from the Hellinger distance to DP.
Lemma 40. We have RHD(ρ) ⊆ R∆ε (δ(ε, ρ)) where















f (x) = (1 − ρ)2(1 − 2x) + x − 2(1 − ρ)
√




(x) = (1 − ρ)2(1 − 2x) + x f − 2(1 − ρ)
√
d(2 − d)x(1 − x)
Proof. We may regard
RHD(ρ) =
{
(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2





(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2
∣∣∣ max((1 − x) − eεy, x − eε(1 − y)) ≤ δ } .
We first calculate the boundary of RHD(ρ). Thus, we solve the following equation for y:
1 −
√
x(1 − y) −
√




x(1 − y) −
√
(1 − x)y = ρ
⇐⇒ (1 − ρ)2 − x(1 − y) − y(1 − x) = 2
√
x(1 − x)y(1 − y)
⇐⇒ (1 − ρ)4 + x2(1 − y)2 + y2(1 − x)2 − 2x(1 − y)(1 − ρ)2 − 2y(1 − x)(1 − ρ)2
The degree of this equation is 2, so we can solve it. For given x ∈ [0, 1], we have
y = (1 − ρ)2(1 − 2x) + x ± 2(1 − ρ)
√
x(1 − x)ρ(2 − ρ).
Thanks to the Symmetry of RHD(ρ) and R∆
ε
(δ), we may consider the curve:
y = (1 − ρ)2(1 − 2x) + x − 2(1 − ρ)
√
x(1 − x)ρ(2 − ρ) = f (x).
The tangent of the curve y = f (x) that passes the point (t, f (t)) is given by the equation
x − yg(t) = t −
f (t)
g(t) where g(x) =
d f
dx (x). We next find t and δ that the lower boundary
(1 − x) − eεy = δ ⇐⇒ x + eεy = 1 − δ
of R∆
ε
(δ(ε, ρ)) is the same as the line x − yg(t) = t −
f (t)
g(t) . We solve the equation e
ε = 1g(t)
on t about the slope as (5). Finally, we obtain δ as (4). 
We conclude an optimal conversion law from the Hellinger distance to DP.
Theorem 41. We always have HDX(d1, d2) ≤ ρ =⇒ ∆εX(d1, d2) ≤ δ(ε, ρ) where δ(ε, ρ)
is given by (4).
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Figure 3: Comparison of the privacy region for DP and the one for 2-cut of Hellinger
distance.
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